Entrapped in the Quadrilemma: Force Modernization, Counterforce Temptations and Deterrence Stability in South Asia?

Abstract

This paper assesses the current dynamics of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan amidst intensive quadrilemma (United States-China-India-Pakistan). For instance, new geopolitical realities such as United States-China competition have intensified the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. The strategic ties between the United States and India to counter China, together with China-Pakistan strategic partnership, aggravates threat perceptions between India and Pakistan, increasing the probability of miscalculation and accidental war. The study finds that India’s force modernization and counterforce temptations are proving catalytic and setting the regional situation toward a nuclear war. Vicious arms race and aggressive posturing are eroding the foundation of nuclear deterrence thereby creating a regional deterrence crisis. The study concludes that India-Pakistan security dilemma amidst quadrilemma can only be addressed through creating new security environment that in turn will enable the two states to initiate a dialogue for the institutionalization of bilateral and multilateral arrangements to secure peace and foster long-term regional stability in South Asia.